How is there a Physics of Information? On characterising physical evolution as information processing. by Maroney, O J E & Timpson, C G
How is there a Physics of Information? On characterising
physical evolution as information processing
O. J. E. Maroney
C. G. Timpson
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford,






We have a conundrum. The physical basis of information is clearly a highly active research
area. Yet the power of information theory comes precisely from separating it from the detailed
problems of building physical systems to perform information processing tasks. Developments
in quantum information over the last two decades seem to have undermined this separation,
leading to suggestions that information is itself a physical entity and must be part of our
physical theories, with resource-cost implications. We will consider a variety of ways in which
physics seems to affect computation, but will ultimately argue to the contrary: rejecting
the claims that information is physical provides a better basis for understanding the fertile
relationship between information theory and physics. Instead, we will argue that the physical
resource costs of information processing are to be understood through the need to consider
physically embodied agents for whom information processing tasks are performed. Doing so
sheds light on what it takes for something to be implementing a computational or information-
processing task of a given kind
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1 Introduction
Information theory, whether considered in terms of communication or computational problems,
is based upon analysing information processing tasks in the abstract, separated from the details
of the physical substrate used to instantiate the task. However, in the last several decades there
has been significant growth in research in a field called ‘The Physics of Information’, whose core
contention is the importance of understanding that information processing is instantiated through
physical systems. One of the slogans associated with this field is that ‘Information is Physical’
[1, 2, 3, 4]. As the late Rolf Landauer asserted:
Information is not a disembodied abstract entity; it is always tied to a physical repre-
sentation. [2]
Although the exact sense in which ‘Information is Physical’ is intended to be understood is often
left somewhat ambiguous (cf. [5]), many of the specific claims made in this field involve there being
fundamental physical resource costs associated with performing information processing tasks, which
costs should be understood as arising from the nature of the abstract information processing task
itself.
In this chapter we will address some of the puzzles concerning these claims. We will begin by
reviewing various ways in which physics and information interconnect, and the associated claims
that certain information processing tasks have intrinsic physical costs. We will suggest that in
order to make good upon these claims, the physics of information needs criteria for determining
when a physical system instantiates a given information processing task, and that these criteria
must be independent of either the model of information processing involved, or the physical theory
describing the systems.
We propose a five-fold criterion which is clearly sufficient—and we argue is also necessary—to
underpin resource-cost claims. These criteria must, furthermore, address the well-known problem of
of the ambiguity of representation: when does a physical system represent a particular computation,
and not some other computation? We argue that our criteria are able to resolve some of the key
ambiguities, by adhering closely to an understanding of the physics of information based not on
information being a physical thing, but rather based upon the physical embodiment of agents who
are using physical systems to perform the information processing tasks in question.
2 Why is there a Physics of Information?
Ab initio, information theory seems based upon separating the analysis of information processing
tasks from the physical systems that perform those tasks. Both the technical notions of com-
putability and of information originally came about through a move away from ties to specific
physical models.
The definition of a Turing Machine [6] made it possible to study the problem of what is com-
putable, and with what difficulty, without being constrained to the particular details of physical
systems needed to perform the computations. The fact that a Universal Turing Machine can
efficiently (i.e., with at most a polynomial time increase) compute any algorithm that can be com-
puted by any particular Turing Machine, made it possible to categorise the complexity of a given
computational problem on the basis of how long it would take a Universal Turing Machine to solve
the problem (while bearing in mind that open questions still exist regarding what precisely that
categorisation is), and made it possible to group computational problems into distinct families
based upon which problems could be solved by conversion (in polynomial time) into some other
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problem with a known solution strategy. This categorisation does not seem to care how the Uni-
versal Turing Machine is implemented, whether through a network of logic gates or through other
means such as cellular automata, for example.
Similarly, Shannon’s coding theorems [7] made it possible to study information-communication
problems without being tied to the particular details of how a signal might be physically coded.
Instead of looking at examples of specific communication schemes, or the content of the messages
themselves, Shannon simply looked at the frequencies fi with which signals occurred, and showed
that the best possible compressibility and rate of transmission of the signals could be given as a
function of those frequencies. The result was an operational definition of the information content




fi ln fi. (1)
In both cases it seemed that a universal resource cost could be derived for the performance of
certain tasks, independent of the specific physical means by which the tasks might be instantiated.
But we now wish to consider a number challenges to the idea that minimum resource costs asso-
ciated with information processing can be wholly separated in this kind of way from the physical
problems of building systems to perform the tasks. To anticipate: we do not wish to suggest that
there are not fairly familiar things which might be said in response to various of the challenges
we shall note; however, what we shall ultimately be after—and what we currently find lacking—is
a unified and principled response to them, in contrast to the case-by-case treatments which one
typically finds.
2.1 The Challenge of Landauer’s Principle
One of the key starting points in the move to consider information as physically embodied—or
physically embroiled—in some significant manner comes from the thermal properties of compu-
tation. Computers typically give off large quantities of heat. The question of whether there is a
non-trivial minimum quantity of heat that a computer must emit started to receive attention from
the 1940’s [8, 9, 10, 11] before Landauer [12] proposed what is now generally regarded as being the
correct way to understand this:
∆Q ≥ −kT∆H. (2)
The heat (∆Q) generated by a computation—however implemented—is at least equal to the re-
duction in Shannon information over the course of the computation (∆H) multiplied by the tem-
perature of the environment in which the heat is generated. Given the similarity in form of the
Shannon information measure and the Gibbs entropy measure
S = −
∫
dxdpP (x, p) lnP (x, p), (3)
it might seem entirely plausible that this should be the case. However, controversy has arisen
[13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] over what exact assumptions could underly the claim than
any physical system—of whatever kind—instantiating a particular computation must bear a ther-
modynamic resource cost.
Whilst it is fair to say that much of the controversy on this question has, at heart, concerned
whether the kind of probabilities that are used in (1) are really of the same kind as are used in
(3), there is also the question (more interesting for our current purposes) of how one can evaluate
the generalisation ‘any physical system’. As Norton complains about statements of Landauer’s
Principle:
One does not so much learn the general principle, as one gets the hang of the sorts of
cases to which it can be applied. [16, p.383]
While there have been a number of attempts [23, 18, 24, 17] to address this complaint and prove
Landauer’s Principle from general physical principles, there is a remarkable lack of agreement in
such attempts as to what kind of assumptions can be taken as valid in constructing such a proof.
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2.2 The Challenge of Quantum Computing
The next challenge comes from a concrete example of how a change in physics has led to a change
in the minimum resource cost associated with an information processing task. The computational
complexity of a given problem is, as we have mentioned, based on how quickly the best possible
computer program, running on a Universal Turing Machine, will solve that problem as the size
of the input to the problem increases. Simple cases, such as adding several numbers, increase
in direct proportion to size and quantity of numbers being added. More complicated problems
increase in time polynomially on the size of the input, and particularly complex problems can
scale exponentially or even factorially with the size of the problem.
For a Universal Turing Machine, the problem of multiplying two numbers together increases
polynomially as the size of the numbers increase. However, the problem of taking a number and
finding if it factorises into two numbers increases super-polynomially.1
Then research in the 1980s and 1990s [25, 26, 27] discovered that a computer based upon the
principles of quantum theory could factorise a number into its primes in only polynomial time
(with an equivalent error to a Probabilistic Turing Machine). Constructing a physical system that
is based upon primitive quantum operations, rather than classical logic gates, seems to lead to the
possibility of an exponential increase in the speed by which some problems can be solved. To date,
no known algorithm operating on a Universal or Probabilistic Turing Machine can perform this
feat. The fundamental resource cost associated with solving the computational problem seems to
be dependent upon physics.
But if a Universal (or Probabilistic) Turing Machine has hidden physical assumption, then
what has happened to the idea of computational complexity as a feature which floats free of the
physical substrate? And if it is the non-classical logic instantiated by quantum computers that
allows the speed-up, how sure can we be that a classical physical system cannot be built which
would alllow efficient instantiatation of equivalent non-classical logic gates?
2.3 The Challenge of Quantum Information
In tandem with the generalisation of the Universal Turing Machine to a Universal Quantum Com-
puter, the second pillar of information theory—the Shannon Information measure—has also had
to be revised in the face of quantum theory. This is, in some ways, even more remarkable. While
no rigorous proof had ever been presented that a Universal Turing Machine really was efficiently
equivalent to any other computational process (relying more on a plausibility argument that ev-
ery realistic process had been shown to be so equivalent), in the case of Shannon Information,
the assumptions seemed much weaker and the conclusion correspondingly stronger. The entire
purpose of Shannon’s theorem is to characterise the signal capacity of a communication channel
independently of the physical means by which the information is transmitted.
However, in the mid-1990s [28, 29] it was shown that a communication channel sending signals
in quantum states could achieve a transmission rate that exceeded that of the Shannon theorem: if
a quantum signal is represented by the quantum state ψi, then the quantum information capacity
of a channel is given by
HQ = −tr[ρ ln ρ], (4)
where ρ =
∑
i piψi, and HQ ≤ H, with equality only occurring when the quantum signal states are
all mutually orthogonal. For a given size of channel, that is, many more distinct quantum states
could be sent intact from sender to receiver than would be possible classically.
The same problem is therefore raised as by the case of quantum computation: the Shannon
information measure was intended to characterise a fundamental resource cost that was indepen-
dent of the physical means by which the task was instantiated. But the change in physics, from
classical to quantum, seems to change this fundamental resource cost.
1Note that for ease of comparison with the quantum case we should extend the notion of the Universal Turing
Machine to a Probabilistic Turing Machine—which is equivalent to a Universal Turing Machine equipped with the
ability to perform a fair coin toss. It is remarkable that there are problems that a Probabilistic Turing Machine is
known to be able to solve, to within some error, exponentially faster than the best known algorithms on a Universal
Turing Machine. However, factorising a number into its primes is—importantly—not one of those problems.
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2.4 The Challenge of Exotic Models of Computation
While the challenges of the last two sections involve genuine advances in physics that have altered
our understanding of the resource costs of performing information processing tasks, the next two
sections will raise families of challenges which have been known, and—on a case by case basis—
largely dismissed, for some time. We raise these challenges not to argue that they should not be
discounted, but rather to start look for whether there is a general set of principles that explains
why they should be disposed of. The first family of challenges is raised by the possibility that—
before we even come to the question of the Universal Quantum Computer—the Universal Turing
Machine might not, in fact, adequately characterise the best, or perhaps the only, means by which a
physical system can instantiate a computation. We can consider various alternative exotic models.
Are the claims that there are intrinsic resource costs such as Landauer’s Principle or computational
complexity, just consequences of the limitations of particular models for how information processing
is physically instantiated? Or can they be considered more general claims about any possible
physical instantiation of information processing?
2.4.1 Analogue computation
The most well known challenge in this family is provided by analogue computation. Much of
the proof of what is computable, and of the complexity of computation, for a Universal Turing
Machine, rests upon the fact that there is only a countable infinity of data storage available to it. An
analogue computer could potentially have a continuous infinity of information storage available, so
these proofs would not apply. Analogue computers are generally discounted as realistic possibilities
due to the effects of noise. In the presence of any finite amount of noise, the computational state
of an analogue computer would be knocked into some different state, destroying the reliability of
the computation. To be robust against such noise, the computational states would have to be
represented by finite regions of the physical state space, and so the analogue computer would be
reduced to a countably infinite amount of data storage. (More generally, any computational speed
up due to analogue computing seems to require a resource cost of an exponentially increasing
precision of the measurement of the computational state). Whilst this objection sounds prima
facie plausible, there remains a concern about the basis on which the challenge is being answered:
while we do not doubt the necessity of including noise in practical problems, the question might be
raised as to why noise is, in principle, an unavoidable problem The existence of noise is not written
into the laws of classical physics, and quantum computing—for example—generally requires the
existence of decoherence free subspaces to proceed: where is the proof that ‘noise-free subspaces’
are not possible in classical physics, allowing analogue computing to proceed?
2.4.2 Objet trouve´ computation
A second challenge in this family comes from the suggestion that there might be physical systems
that happen to be able to solve a complex problem in a short period of time. Suppose, for example,
that it was possible to come across, or to build, a quantum system with an atom confined in a
potential, where the eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian of the system correspond to the sequence of
prime numbers [30]. Then if one wished to test whether an integer was prime or not—a computa-
tionally hard problem—one could simply shine a laser beam on the system, with a frequency that
matches the integer in question. If the system resonates, then the integer is prime (interestingly,
this would demonstrate that a number was not prime without determining its prime factors). And
the time taken to perform this test would not seem to have any dependence on the size of the
number being tested.
Two responses to this kind example can readily be discerned. The first would note that the
precision of both the laser frequency and the potential would need to be very fine, to avoid a
non-prime numbered frequency resonating a nearby prime number eigenvalue. This seems to be a
similar kind of objection to the noise objection to analogue computing. The second is a concern as
to whether it is genuinely possible to calculate the potential required accurately without already
knowing the sequence of prime numbers. In other words, to build the system it might be necessary
first already to have solved the problem itself, in which case solving the problem requires simply
looking up the previously-found answer, rather than deploying a laser. (See [5, §6.4] for discussion
of a related example of Nielsen’s [31].)
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2.4.3 Niagra Falls computation
The next cases adapt a well known problem that has been raised in the literature on the philosophy
of mind: the problem of whether it is even possible to state unambiguously whether a given physical
system is uniquely instantiating a particular computation, and not some other [32, 33]. We will
have more to say on this later (see Section 3). For now, let us start by considering Niagara Falls.
Standing and looking at Niagara Falls, you will be observing a large amount of matter going
through a great number of complex physical transformations. It is is reasonable to suppose that,
for any given computation you care to think of, somewhere in Niagara Falls there will be some part
of the flow of water whose complex transformations match the abstract transformations required
to perform the computation. Is Niagara Falls factorising large numbers into their primes, then?
The problem can be made more absurd by noting two further points: any classical computation
can be efficiently performed by a reversible computer [34, 35] and any reversible computation corre-
sponds to the action of a permutation on the computational states. Now, we can take a sufficiently
large, but stationary system, and after labelling which physical states represent the input states
for a computational problem, simply re-label the physical states as representing output states that
correspond to the appropriate permutation of their input states. Call this Stationary Computing.
Now the stationary system is apparently performing any computation by simply sitting there, be-
ing stationary. Such a conclusion is clearly absurd. What has gone wrong? Two considerations
present themselves. The first is that we cannot read out the answer from the stationary computer
unless we already know the relevant permutations, and this would correspond to us already hav-
ing solved the relevant computational problem ourselves independently. Or second, if instead of
this we were handed a code book that allowed us to decode the answer from the output state (or
equivalently, encode the input state) then either the code is simply a look-up table that requires us
to have already solved the problem as before, or else we will find that the decoding process will in
fact be the computation, and all the resource costs have simply been transferred from the system
to the decoding.
2.5 The Challenge of Different Physics
We now turn to the final set of challenges: quantum information and quantum computing appear
to show that both the notions of Shannon Information and of Turing Computability, despite having
originally been intended to be abstract analyses that floated free of physical assumptions, must
have had hidden physical assumptions buried in them all along. If this can happen once, how are
we sure that there are not further apparently innocuous physical assumptions we are making in
our analyses of information and computation? And what happens if we take into account other
physics, such as relativity, or even the possibility of our current best theories being replaced by
entirely new physics?
One example in this line is that of hypercomputation. The notion of time resource associated
with the hierarchy of complexity classes is not based upon the passage of physical time, but rather
upon the number of elementary computational steps that are required. If the length of time per
computational step is constant, then things are straightforward. But various hypercomputational
models exploit the possibility that if each successive computational step takes a shorter and shorter
length of time, then even a infinite number of computational steps might take place within a finite
length of time. Is this physically possible? While quantum theory appears to provide ‘speed
bumps’ [36], that would rule this out, general relativity seems to allow the possibility of space-
times in which hypercomputation is possible [37, 38]. In a Malament–Hogarth space-time (which
is not globally hyperbolic) one observer can, in a finite proper time, see the time line of a second
system pass through an infinite proper time (before hitting a singularity). If the second system
is a Universal Turing Machine, this can be used to solve the Halting Problem, which is formally
unsolvable using a Universal Turing Machine. Here then, not only would complexity classes differ
from the standard case, but so also would the computability class: the set of problems which can
be solved at all.
If solutions to general relativity that are not globally hyperbolic are considered physically
possible, then this also raises the possibility of computation involving closed-time like curves,
which would again present a very different landscape [39, 40, 41, 42].
Finally, we note that even in the absence of experimental evidence, it is possible to reason about
theories that might replace quantum theory in the same manner that quantum theory replaced
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classical physics. Generalised Probabilistic Theories [43, 44] would allow information processing
to take place differently to quantum theory. Once one has accepted that these things can change
because quantum theory comes along, what is to stop one believing that things can change further if
something else comes along? If, for example, a Popescu–Rohrlich non-local box [45] was discovered
to be possible, would this have as dramatic an impact upon the definition of information as the
discovery of quantum entanglement has done?
2.6 What is the Basis of the Resource Cost Claim?
To recap: the initial success of the theories of information and computation was that they seemed
to provide a way of analysing information processing which was independent of particular models
for how the processing task was to be physically instantiated. Resource costs could then be
defined—such as channel requirements given data compression, the complexity of computation,
or the thermal costs expressed in Landauer’s Principle—on the basis that any possible physical
process that instantiates a given information processing task will have an intrinsic physical resource
cost purely as a result of the properties of the (abstract) information processing task itself. At
first blush, the advent of quantum information and quantum computation seemed an exciting new
development within this picture; a sympathetic amendement or extension of it: here there were
interesting new physical resource costs to incorporate into a richer physics of information. But
equally—and catastrophically—one might see quantum information and computation instead as
driving nails into the coffin of the physics of information. For once one has recognised that the
details of physical instantiation cannot be ignored, then where do things end, as the challenges
represented by our other examples illustrate? Even Landauer’s venerable principle might seem in
question. How can any non-trivial statements about the resource costs of information processing
be defined? How can there be a physics of information at all? Why isn’t there just physics?
It is dealing with the quantification ‘any possible physical process’ which is causing the trouble
here. Any analysis that leads to a resource-cost claim might have made implicit physical assump-
tions about the underlying process: perhaps there exists some more clever method of instantiating
the task which would avoid the cost. Thus analogue computing could do better, if it were possible
to eliminate noise or efficiently measure states with exponential precision. Or to take another
example, quantum computing uses a different family of primitive gates to classical computing, but
the explanation for its doing better—its speed-up over the classical case—is not this detail of an
abstract computing language, but rather the fact that discrete classical physical systems cannot
efficiently instantiate the relevant quantum logic gates. Exploiting this fact gives the cleverer
method of achieving the computational task.
The second aspect to the problem is that the notion of ‘possible physical process’ is itself a
shifting terrain. Quantum theory has shown that abstract notions of information and computa-
tional complexity change if the fundamental physics changes. Why should we not expect general
relativity, a quantum theory of gravity, or some post-quantum theory such as general probabilistic
theories, similarly to force a fundamental revision in our notions of what kind of physical processes
are possible for information processing? The very notion of information seems to have become
dependent upon the physical theory used to model its processing. So how can we ask what the
physical resource cost is of an information processing task, when the physics itself may be changing?
In our view what is needed is a perspective on all this that allows one to step a bit further
back. To make a claim that an information processing task has an intrinsic resource cost, one will
need:
• An abstract characterisation of the information processing task. What are the inputs, the
outputs, and the logical relations between them? Who is being informed of what (and by
whom)?
• Necessary (and sufficient) criteria for determining when a physical system instantiates a given
information processing task.
• A proof, within any given physical theory, whether those criteria can be met, and if so, at
what resource cost.
and we need to be able to apply these to any information processing logic, instantiated by any
physical theory.
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The challenges to the physics of information we have considered so far have primarily been
pressing on the first and third of these requirements. We will now turn to the second requirement.
3 The Ambiguity of Representation.
The next challenge we must immediately confront is that, even in the most well understood case
(classical information processing on classical system) the question of necessary and sufficient criteria
for a physical system to instantiate a computation turns out to be a somewhat difficult and
controversial problem.
Let us take the simplest suggestion: we define a logical gate as a map from a set of input states
to a set of output states. In the case of the AND gate, for example, the map is:





Now we design a physical system to instantiate that operation, in the simplest manner imag-
inable. We pick three physical system, each with a large number of physical states, x1, x2 and x3,
and we associate a region of the physical state space of each with a logical state, so that if the
physical state of the first system is in the region {x1}0, that represents A being in logical state 0,
and if the physical state of the second system is in the region {x2}1, that represents B being in
logical state 1 etc.
Now all that is required of our physical instantiation of the AND gate is to find some physical
evolution of the system, f , that evolves2 physical state x into physical state y = f(x), and which
ensures that whenever the first two systems initially lie in the joint region {x1}A{x2}B then at
the end of the process the third system will always lie in the region {x3}(A·B). More generally we
can state this formally as: if the set of physical states {x}α represent the overall logical state α
then the physical evolution y = f(x) instantiates the logical map β = M(α), if and only if, ∀α, β,
y = f(x) ∈ {x}M(β) whenever x ∈ {x}α.
Now, the ‘∀α, β’ is important here, when calculating the resource cost of some operation. It is
essential that the counterfactual if some other input had been used, the correct output would still
have been reached holds, if the physical system is to truly be instantiating the operation.
Consider the following scenario (we owe the example to James Ladyman). A colleague suggests
to you that they have a machine that can add two numbers much faster than a normal computer.
To demonstrate they take you into a room with racks and racks of boxes, each box labelled with
two numbers, and possessed of a button and a display screen. When you suggest two numbers
to add, they pick up the box labelled by those two numbers and press the button. Immediately,
the screen on the box lights up displaying the sum of those two numbers. When you suggest two
different numbers, they do the same but with a correspondingly different box.
The problem here is that there is no reason to believe that any box is really performing the
addition operation at all—for all we can tell, there might as well just be a light inside, with the
pre-calculated answer already printed on the screen ready to show when the screen is back-lit.3
We need one physical process that could have started with any valid input, and ends with the
corresponding correct output in each case.4
So: we now happily build our physical instantiation of an AND gate, satisfying the mapping
criterion stated above, and excitedly show it to a colleague. She looks blankly at us and says
2We are treated the evolution as deterministic in this simple example. Generalising this formulation to a funda-
mental stochastic dynamics is straightforward, but adds nothing to the argument.
3For illustrative purposes we have just framed the issue in epistemic terms: ‘no reason to believe...for all we can
tell’. But the point is actually about what it takes for a device to be implementing some logical operation; this is a
modal—a counterfactually loaded—notion.
4The room-full of numbered boxes would, perhaps, be a valid instantiation of addition, provided that all the
pre-processing associated with deciding which box to select was included in the evaluation of the resource cost. Of
course, even in this case, the presumably finite number of boxes involved would mean this approach would not scale
to the addition of large numbers.
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‘What are you talking about? That’s an OR gate!’. What has happened is that the physical states
that we took to represent logical state 0, our colleague took to represent logical state 1, and vice
versa. And under that different choice of representation, the exact same physical system is indeed
representing an OR gate.
Now it might be tempting to try to establish that the physical system either really is instan-
tiating an AND gate, or really is instantiating an OR gate, but we suggest that this would be a
mistake. Suppose we now want to build a larger operation, out of AND and OR gates, then we
could quite happily use exactly the same kind of physical process for each of the gates, but just
wire up the connections to the inputs and outputs differently in the two cases. So it seems that
there just is a fundamental ambiguity in which kind of gate the physical process instantiates.
Unfortunately, things do not stop there. Another colleague looks at the same system, and
claims we have built an entirely different device altogether, one that performs a complex matrix
multiplication. And when asked to explain how, it turns out that he has chosen a division of
the physical states that is entirely different from ours, when representing the logical states. This
is the problem that underlies the ‘Niagara Falls’ computation we saw in Section 2.4. If we are
just using the criterion that the physical evolution must reproduce the logical operation, with
complete freedom as to how the the physical states represent the logical states, any sufficiently large
complicated system could be argued to instantiate any computation whatsoever. And reflecting on
the case of Stationary Computation mentioned earlier, this would even apply to a system sitting
there doing nothing, since any computation can be simulated just by permuting which unevolving
physical states are to count as which logical states.
Of course there are ways to resist this seemingly pathological prospect of Stationary Com-
puting, perhaps the most obvious being that we would seem to have to know the answer to the
computation already in order to know how to label the output states correctly. But for now, we
want to retain much of the ambiguity of representation, firstly because it may be of practical use to
be able to use the same physical system to instantiate different operations, and secondly because
we should be wary of ruling out some particular exotic computational model too hastily, in case
our justification for ruling it out would also rule out another seemingly exotic model which, on
development, might have more than a little going for it. Consider:
Stationary Quantum Computing
• Any quantum operation can be implemented by unitary on a sufficiently large Hilbert space.
• Unitaries are just a change of basis.
• So any quantum computation can be performed by just preparing a state and then measuring
in a rotated basis.
Stationary quantum computing is, occasionally, a useful way of studying the possibilities of
quantum computation, but also, when the complexities of actually performing the measurement
through a series of elementary operations, is taken it account, this model starts to become very
close to Measurement Based Quantum Computing [46, 47, 48], which is one of the more viable
models for practical quantum computing.
Now: the problem of the ambiguity of representation has been studied extensively, with partic-
ular importance for debates around computational theories of cognition (see e.g., [32, 33, 49, 50,
51, 52, 53, 54]). If it is thought that the mind is basically computational in nature, a matter of
some interesting software running on some physical (presumably largely neurological) hardware,
then it becomes rather important to be able to identify what software is running, and in virtue
of what kinds of facts it is the case—if indeed it is the case—that some particular piece of com-
putation is being perfomed on some occasion as opposed to some other one, or indeed none at
all. We do not propose to address this large issue here, interesting and important as it is. For us
this problem of the ambiguity of representation is embedded within and quite naturally at home
in information theory because—as we said at the start—the whole point about the success of the
Church/Turing notions of computability, and of the success of the Shannon Coding theorems, was
that they analysed information processing abstracted from the essentially arbitrary ways in which
the information might physically be represented and operated upon. And this was a good thing.
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4 The Five Criteria
We have seen that some facet of ambiguity of representation may be a good thing. But if our only
requirement for a process to count as computational or as information processing is simply having
an evolution of the physical states which reproduces the mapping of the logical states, then this
will leave too much ambiguity to be able to analyse the fundamental resource costs of information
processing, with it being unclear that it amounts to any restriction at all. Fortunately, more
restrictive criteria have been developed in various contexts, and we now turn to examine these.
4.1 Quantum Computing and DiVincezo
In the 1990s, when the field of quantum computing was really beginning to develop, there were a
great many proposals for which kind of physical systems might be viable for a scalable quantum
computer. DiVincenzo (1997) [55] clarified the criteria which a system needed to meet to be a
realistic possibility. His criteria were (paraphrasing):
1. A Hilbert space representation of the quantum states. The proposed systems must not simply
be classical systems representing quantum states, but actually use a physical structure with
a Hilbert space to represent the quantum states.
2. Initialisation of the physical system into a standard state. In order to get the computation
going, the quantum system had to first be put into a ‘fiducial starting quantum state’.
3. Noise tolerance, especially with respect to decoherence affects. To perform quantum oper-
ations successfully it was essential to ensure that quantum coherence was not lost during
the operations, so the system must have a high degree of isolation from the environment.
This proved to be one of the biggest problems for early proposals until the development of
quantum error correction codes and fault tolerance[56, 57, 58].
4. Ability to perform all the needed unitary operations. By analogy to a classical computer, a
network constructed from a small set of elementary, universal logic gates (such as AND and
NOT), a quantum computer needed to be a network constructed from small set of elementary,
universal quantum operations (many 2 qbit quantum gates, such as the quantum controlled-
NOT gate, satisfied this requirement). The development of more exotic models of quantum
computation, such as quantum annealing or measurement-based quantum computation, led
to this requirement being relaxed slightly: the evolution of a quantum computer had only to
be unitarily equivalent to a network model of a universal quantum computer.
5. Ability to perform a strong projective measurement to read the output. While in a classical
system, the end of the computation simply leaves the device holding the answer, in a quan-
tum system it is necessary to perform a quantum measurement, meaning something rather
different than simply a further unitary evolution, so that the result of the computation could
be read out.
4.2 Landauer’s Principle and Maroney
As described earlier (Section 2.1), one of the complaints raised about the resource claim associated
with Landauer’s Principle is that there was no proof offered that any physical system must be of
the kind to which Landauer’s Principle applied. In attempting to clarify the basis of Landauer’s
Principle, one of us put forward necessary criteria for a physical system to implement a classical
logical operation (Maroney, Section 1.2 2005 [15], Sections II.D and II.E 2009 [18]). While the
criteria varied slightly between the two papers, they shared a number of features in common
(numbering follows the criteria as stated in 2005):
1. That there are distinct regions of the physical state space, which are used to represent the
distinct logical states (2009 Section II.D 1-5)
2. When the physical system is placed in a state in one of the regions, it does not leave that
region unless acted on by an operation. (2009, Section II.D 6).
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3. It should be possible to reliably set the system to be in a physical state within one of the
regions, even if it is not possible to set it into a precise physical state (This criterion was not
explicitly mentioned in 2009)
4. It must be possible to determine the region of the physical state space in which the system
lies (2009, only implicitly in the requirements of Section II.D 3-4)
5. There must be physical interactions that allow the logical operations to be performed (2009
Section II.E).
Beyond the second requirement, of the stability of the representation of the logical states, noise
tolerance was not explicitly referred to for the operations themselves.
4.3 Unconventional Computation and Horsman et al.
In parallel to our own thinking on these matters, Horsman et al. [59] were independently seeking
to address the question of when exotic computational models (which they refer to as ‘unconvential
computation’) could be properly understood as performing a computation. While their analysis
was expressed in different terms, exploring an analogy between confidence in unconventional com-
putation and confidence in physical theories, the criteria they identify match the criteria we were
developing:
1. There exists a representation relation between the input and output states of the physical
system and the abstract states of the computational model
2. That this representation results in a commutative diagram when the evolution of the physical
states, according to a theory of the physical system in which there was a high degree of of
confidence, is compared to the abstract computation in the model
3. That the physical state of the system at the start is encoded with the input logical state
through an initialisation process.
4. That the logical output state is read off from the physical state of the system at the end,
through a decoding process.
5. That the high degree of confidence in the physical theory used to predict the evolution of the
system, is based upon it having been experimentally tested to within a good error bound.
4.4 The Final Five Criteria
The various criteria listed above display some variation, because each was developed to analyse a
particular kind of problem. However, one can see clear similarity across these different cases:
1. Representation of logical states by physical states
The physical system has to have the right kind of physical states available to represent all
the required logical states. This representation will need faithfully to preserve the relevant
properties of the logical states. In the case of classical computational states, for example,
they need to be distinct, so the physical representations must correspond to distinguishable
regions of the physical state space. Quantum computational states, by contrast, will need to
be represented by physical states which include the phase relationships between the logical
states.
The question of what the relevant structural properties are will, of course, vary between
different kinds of logics of information processing, but provided the relevant properties are
there in the physical representation, there is the full freedom to choose how to implement
this which the ambiguity of representation allows.
2. Initialisation of physical states
There must be a controllable physical processes which can reliably set the system to be in
each of the initial representative states. The resource costs (such as time, space or work) that
this initialisation process uses must be counted as part of the resource cost of the information
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processing task. So all pre-processing must be included, otherwise it is possible simply to
transfer the costs of performing the task to an initial encoding operation, such as in the case
of the ‘Stationary Computing Model’, with an initial encoding that actually performs the
permutation part of the computation.
3. Equivalence of evolution
The information processing task will involve a set of operations which map5 input logical
states to output logical states. The physical processes must evolve the representative physical
states equivalently to the mapping of the logical states. It is important that the physical
system does not just instantiate a particular mapping of input to output state. All the
counterfactual claims must also be true of the system: if it had been presented with a
representation of a different input state, the physical process would have still produced the
representation of the correct corresponding output state. The resource costs (time, space,
work) associated with this are part of the resource cost of the information processing task.
4. Readout of results
It is important to understand this not just as specifying the representation of the final logical
states. It is the requirement that the final output of the information processing task must
be in a form that is directly accessible to anyone who needs the information, in the sense not
only that the output be of a kind which is readable, but it also be fixed exactly what logical
output is represented.
In classical information processing, it might be assumed that the internal logical states can
be read off from the physical states without any problems. However, for quantum compu-
tation, this is not necessarily the case. A quantum computation would generally involve
non-orthogonal states, which cannot be distinguished, and cannot be measured without de-
stroying phase coherence and disrupting the computation. Here, then, final measurement
stage is needed at the end of the computation. For models of analogue computation, the
readout stage also cannot be ignored: the need to measure the physical state with an ex-
ponentially increasing precision is of course one of the principal limitations which makes
analogue computing unfeasible.
Once again, the resource cost (time, space, work) of this final stage must also be included
in overall the resource cost of the information processing task. All post-processing must be
included, otherwise we have the problem of the ‘Stationary Computing Model’, where the
resource costs are simply shifted to a final decoding step.
5. Error tolerance
As the physical system is initialised, evolves and is measured, errors will inevitably occur.
The errors depend upon both the kind of physical system being used and the kind of infor-
mation processing task. Error tolerances is a major issue in the construction of a quantum
computer, where environmentally induced decoherence can rapidly destroy a systems ability
to perform quantum operations within quantum error correction codes. Error tolerance is
also an issue for analog computing, and is generally considered to be the primary reason it is
not feasible. Although error tolerance does not attract much attention in studies of classical
computation, that is simply because the problem has been practically solved, and highly
fault tolerant classical computers exist. That it can still be a problem becomes much clearer
when computers overheat: in modern computing centres, the air-conditioning is one of the
significant constraints upon computing power. In fact, error tolerance was understood to be
a potential problem in the early development of classical computing, leading von Neumann
to prove that classical computing could be made error tolerant (cf. Aaronson [60]).
Criteria 1 and 3 are just the same criteria that we studied in Section 3. Criteria 5 adds error
tolerance, but this does not affect the problems that were raised by the ambiguity of representation.
If our criteria are to resolve the problems we have encountered, it must be due to the addition of
Criteria 2 and 4: the initialisation and readout stages.
5This includes stochastic maps, so that probabilistic operations and machines are included.
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5 Information and the Physically Embodied Agent
It is not hard to maintain that our Criteria 1, 3, and 5 above are necessary conditions—but do
not seem to be sufficient—to ensure that the information processing task is being performed. Our
contention is that Criteria 2 and 4 are also necessary conditions, and that together 1–5 constitute
a sufficient condition.
But that not everyone might agree is made clear by the followng passage, from a paper by
Ladyman, which is also concerned with analysing when a physical system is performing a compu-
tation:
In practice of course it is only possible to use a system as a computer if: (a) the relevant
physical states are distinguishable by us (with our measurement devices); and (b) it
is possible for us to put the system into a chosen initial state so as to compute the
function in question for it. However, in principle some reason must be given as to why
a system with respect to which these constraints are not met cannot be considered to
be computing nonetheless. [61]
Given our argument so far, it seems there would be trouble if some principled reason could not
be offered here, or trouble at least for the physics of information. For we have tried to argue that
physical resource-cost claims cannot reasonably be made absent conditions like our full range 1–5
above, specifically including Criteria 2 and 4, which latter pair Ladyman seems to want to deny
as essential. So much the worse for the physics of information it might be maintained! But we
wish to preserve a domain for the physics of information—properly understood—and we think that
a principled reason can be offered for why Criteria 2 and 4 should be conceived to be necessary
conditions for computation to be happening at all, not just for its being useful.
To develop these thoughts we will need to clarify further what we understand by an information
processing task.
We began our discussion with the general problem of trying to understand how information
processing tasks could come with physical resource costs, purely by virtue of the identity of the
information processing task itself. One obvious solution to this which we have not mentioned so
far would be to propose that information itself should be conceived of as an independent physical
property, such as energy or charge, or perhaps as some new kind of stuff, a new material or
quasi-material substance, perhaps. This might make the idea that there is a physical cost to
information processing seem perfectly natural. However, it would also seem to require there to
be an unambiguous matter of physical fact that a given physical system is instantiating a specific
information processing task, and that seems to be problematic.
Here we take an alternative view of the relationship between information and physics, drawing
on the ideas developed in [5]. It is more than a little useful, in our view, to reflect that the
term‘information’ is an abstract noun, and correlatively to note that:
Very often, abstract nouns arise as nominalisations of various adjectival or verbal
forms... their function may be explained in terms of the conceptually simpler ad-
jectives or verbs from which they derive... ’information’ is to be explained in terms of
the verb ’to inform’. Information... is what is provided when somebody is informed of
something. [5, p.11]
We may often seem to use phrases such as ‘information is gathered”, ‘information was com-
municated’, ‘information will be stored’, as if information were some object or property that we
can search for, pick up, move around and put somewhere. But there are also situations where it
is not clear how that conception could make sense: for example, if some data is encrypted, and
the encrypted data is stored separately from the encryption keys, the information seems only to
be present in the correlations between the encrypted data and the encryption key. Destroy either,
and the information appears lost (thereby also raising questions like ‘where did the information
go?’)
We do well to step back and think about information not as a physical object or property,
but rather as pertaining to a process or an activity for informing: it is ‘what is provided when
someone is informed of something’. So in each case, rather than use the abstract noun, we could
more fundamentally refer instead to the process of informing:
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• ‘information is gathered’ vs. ‘an information gathering task is performed’
• ‘information is communicated’ vs. ‘an information communication task is performed’
• ‘information is stored’ vs. ‘an information storage task is performed’
• ‘information is processed’ vs. ‘an information processing task is performed’ etc.
On this conception, the different kinds of information processing tasks are different means by which
someone is informed of something (and by someone). These tasks might be very complicated: the
someone who is being informed may also be the someone who is doing the informing, for example
if they are using a computer to perform a calculation; a communication task may involve multiple
partners trying to communicate different things to each other, whilst concealing things from other
people; some tasks, such as information storage, may be defined by the need indefinitely to defer
the informing stage.
The important point we wish to draw from this for our purposes in this chapter, is that when
seen in this way, an information processing task is defined by the question of who is being informed
of what, and by whom, and the question of how that task may be physically instantiated is going
to need to include a specification of how the informers and informees—as physically embodied
systems themselves—interact with the information processing system. It is this which enforces
and underwrites Criteria 2 and 4 as necessary requirements (pace Ladyman), in our view.
It is key that these someones are physically embodied agents. To inform, they must be able
physically to start the process of initialisation, and if they cannot do this, the information process-
ing task cannot begin. To be informed, the information must be presented to them in a form that
they can directly perceive. The readout stage is required to do this, and until that has happened,
the information processing task cannot be said to have completed. If either of those processes fail,
the information processing task has not succeeded. Equally, if both those processes succeed, and
the remaining criteria are also met, then the information processing task has certainly taken place.
Thus we argue, on this view of information, the five criteria are indvidually necessary and jointly
sufficient for a physical system to instantiate a well-defined information processing task.
We can start to see a little of how this will work by looking again at the humble example of
the AND gate. The same physical process could be used to instantiate an OR gate. The difference
between the two cases seemed to be how the physical states were chosen to represent the logical
states, which seemed arbitrary. But what our criteria now add—to resolve this arbitrariness—is
the requirement that when the system is actually being used to instantiate a particular informa-
tion processing task then the initialisation and readout stages will fix exactly how the physical
system is being used. Specifying those stages as an integral part of the task lifts the ambiguity of
representation. The question of whether the physical process is an AND or an OR gate cannot be
determined simply by looking at its physical evolution alone, but must involve a broader context.
The question will be determined instead by how, in a given instance, the physical system is actually
being used to inform, in virtue of its relation to someones as informers and informees.
Once the initialisation and readout stages are included as necessary components in any infor-
mation processing task, the answers to many of the challenges we outlined earlier become unified.
We have already seen how including the initialisation and readout naturally answers the problem of
Stationary Computing, where the actual computation is shifted into a calculation of how physical
states must be permuted to represent either the input or output logical states. It also answers the
problem of the Niagara Falls computer: while there may be complex physical evolutions taking
place within the waterfall, there is no-one who is initialising the state of the falling water, nor
anyone reading out the supposed result6. No-one is being informed of any computation by such
physical processes, so they are not information processing tasks.
It might be objected that some information processing tasks do not seem to lead to anyone being
informed, such as information storage. Even in these cases, though, we would argue, the definition
of a readout stage is a necessary component in the task. If the data is stored in an encrypted or
encoded form, or is stored on the internal degrees of freedom of a physical device, such as a hard
disc drive, the definition of the information storage task must include the specification of how that
6We may also note that it is unclear if the counterfactual condition on the equivalence of evolution holds in this
model: if, somehow, someone had been able to ‘initialise’ a portion of the water to a different state, would the
subsequent evolution still have produced the correct outcome?
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data can be extracted again, whether through decoding the data, or through physically reading
the data and presenting it to another system. If the coding scheme were to be lost or destroyed,
the data would be lost too as it would be impossible to access it, and the data would no longer be
meaningfully described as stored. Equally, if the technology needed physically to extract the data
were to be damaged or lost, it would be impossible to access the data, and the storage task would
have failed. For an information storage task to succeed, it is necessary that at some point in the
future the data will still be accessible to someone, and the specification of how this readout stage
can be achieved is still part of the overall information processing task.
We also wish to note that the need to include the physical process of initialisation and readout
within the definition of the information processing task, leaves a great deal of freedom to exploit
the ambiguity of representation in the way the task is instantiated in-between input and output.
The definition of the information processing task must refer to the logical inputs and outputs as
they are perceived by the physically embodied agents, but the equivalence of evolution criterion
just refers to the overall mapping of these inputs and outputs, and does not need to specify a
particular method by which it is achieved: there may be many different algorithms for achieving
the same information processing task. So we need not identify the information processing task with
any particular algorithm or computational model. It may even be the case that a given physical
process for achieving the task could be interpreted in more than one way, in the same manner
that the same physical process could be interpreted as an AND gate or an OR gate. Provided the
initialisation and readout stages define the manner in which the physically embodied agents are
informed, however, the instantiation of the information processing task itself will not suffer from
this ambiguity.
6 What makes a Someone?
Our proposal is that the question of how information processing tasks can be physically instantiated
cannot be separated from the question of the existence of physically embodied agents who are
informing and being informed by the task. We have argued that this means that initialisation
and readout stages must be included within the definition of the task, and that this also provides
a principled answer to problems involving the ambiguities of representation when calculating the
resource costs associated with information processing. However, the question still arises, what kind
of physically embodied system is needed to fulfil the role of a someone to inform or be informed?
There may be danger of a lurking circularity or a descent into vacuity here. And is it really true
that information processing cannot take place without such a system or systems?
6.1 Boltzmann’s Laptop falls into a black hole
Consider the following somewhat unlikely scenario. A large cloud of interstellar dust is going
through thermal fluctuations when, by chance, these fluctuations lead to a chunk of matter coa-
lescing into a physical object that happens to be in exactly the same state as the laptop on which
this chapter is being written. The keyboard of this fluctuation-born laptop gets bounced around,
leading to this very sentence appearing on its screen. And then the laptop falls into a nearby black
hole and no-one ever sees it.
Now it might seem reasonable to say that that the fluctuation-born laptop did exactly the same
computation and exactly the same information processing tasks as the laptop on which this paper
was written. But it is a consequence of our point of view that this is not the case: no-one was
being informed of anything, so no information processing task was taking place. It just happened
to be a random thing that happened in space.
We might draw the parallel here to familiar questions about representation and in particular to
Putnam’s famous example of an ant crawling across the desert and accidentally inscribing the face
of Winston Churchill on the sand [62, chpt.1]. Is the pattern in the sand actually a representation
of Winston Churchill or was it just a random pattern that happens to resemble something else? It
seems that it must only be a surprising random pattern for there was of course no intention on the
ant’s part to make a representation of Winston Churchill, or indeed a representation of any kind;
and anway, the ant had never come into any kind of appropriate causal contact with Churchill, or
anyone who knew him, or knew of him.
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However, there is something more that can be said about the fluctuation-born laptop. Had
a passing spaceship noticed the laptop before it fell into the black hole, and scooped it up, then
they would still have a perfectly good laptop which they could then use to perform computations,
including writing about computations. The fact that it had come into existence by a random
nonintentional process would not matter.
Yet there is a difference between having the capacity to perform a task and actually performing
the task. While the laptop was floating through the dust cloud, randomly looking—if there were
anyone to look—like it was typing up a chapter it can be considered to have shown the physical
capacity to perform an information processing task, but it was not actually performing any such
task. Only were the laptop to be scooped up and put to use would it indeed be using that capacity
to inform the passing space travellers.
Similarly, the physical system instantiating the AND gate has the capacity to be used as an
AND gate or an OR gate. Left to itself, it is doing neither. Only when it is placed in the context
of being used by someone in an information processing task can it be said actually to be operating
as one gate or another.
Information measures are often just ways of quantifying the capacity of systems to perform
various information processing tasks. We can examine a physical system and analyse and quantify
whether it has the capacity to perform a particular information processing task whether or not
anyone actually uses the system to perform that task. But we would argue that it is only actually
performing an information processing task if it is actually being used to perform such a task7.
6.2 Automata and other things
Still, we must ask: what does it take to be a someone? What about non-human animals, what
about artefacts or various other kinds of things in general? What about automata? What about a
thermostat informing the boiler of the temperature of the room? What about information stored
in DNA being read during ontogenesis? These last two are very familiar examples of situations in
which people often use the language of information, although it may seem unclear who or what
would be supposed to be being informed, by our criteria. Given that this use of language seems
to have pragmatic value at the very least, can we really be arguing that it is nevertheless wrong?
Does a thermostat inform the boiler of the temperature of the room? Are thermostats and
boilers the kind of physical systems that can count as a someone? We might wish to define a
someone in terms of the network of causal relationships they are part of, or in terms of agency—
their capacities to interact with and respond states of the world external to them. The problem
here, for us, is that trying to make those suggestions precise will often lead to a definition that is
itself couched in information processing terms (for example, in the physics literature, physically
embodied agents are often defined in terms of ‘information gathering and utilising systems’). This
risks either introducing a circularity, or a return to the problem of the ambiguity of representation,
but now applied one level up, to the entire system which includes the physically embodied someones
being informed.
It seems there are two possible directions one could go in response to this. The first involves
firmly digging in one’s heels, and saying that these general kinds of systems are not properly-
speaking agents at all, and they are not informers or informees. In this case, while information-
talk about such systems might be a useful metaphor or analogy to employ, we should not regard
it as anything more than that: a useful metaphor or analogy.8 A problem with this direction is
that it may look too restrictive, especially when one reflects that systems like the thermostat may
actually involve physical items—such as programmable microchips—which we otherwise would
have described as information processors. Perhaps we could refer to the overall process, in this
case the overall process of regulating the temperature of the room, and attempt to cast that in
terms of information processing for us, but such a move can seem rather forced.
The second direction is more liberal, again looking at the overall process, but seeing that it can
be analysed into separate parts, some of which can be cast in terms of an information processing
7That our criteria seem almost—but not quite—to turn the answer to the question into a tautology is, to us, an
indication that we are along the right lines!
8It makes a difference whether one says metaphor or analogy. Metaphors are not generally considered to be
candidates for literal truth and they derive their communicative purpose precisely from this. Analogies by contrast
are, typically, candidates for literal truth, involving a claim of the form: A is to B as C is to D, cf. [63].
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task. If that information processing task would be the same if the systems informing and being
informed could be replaced by physical systems (such as ourselves) that are uncontroversially
identifiable as agents, without affecting the overall process, then it is valid to talk of that part of
the process as being an information processing task. So, a thermostat may not be informing a
boiler of something, but a boiler might be seen as using a thermostat as an information processing
device, to inform itself about the temperature of the room, in just the same way that we might
look at a thermometer to inform ourselves and decide whether or not to turn the heating on. The
worry with this strategy is that too liberal an approach risks the possibility of everything and
anything being cast in information processing terms, which obscures or obviates the point of the
description.
6.3 Epistemic Communities of Agents
One of the key features of our physically embodied agents is that they must be able to initialise
the process, and receive the readout. It is their physical attributes and abilities that ultimately fix
the start and end points of the process. Does this mean that any physical resource cost associated
with an information processing task will be different for different someones?
In practice, initialisation and readout procedures will be relatively insensitive to many—perhaps
the majority—of the details of the specific physical agent being informed, as such agents will tend
to form what we may term (with a nod to van Fraassen) shared epistemic communities. A shared
epistemic community means a group of people, or entities, or agents, that can share and access
the same information. They therefore have the ability to interact with the same information
processing devices through the same kind of physical means. Put another way, we can think in
terms of initialisation and readout being defined relative to a set of physically well-defined observers
that share roughly the same kind of capacities to respond to and change the world surrounding
them. It will be an objective physical fact about what the initialisation and readout capacities of
a given epistemic community is.
But we can go further. In terms of physical abilities, humans, sheep and pigs (to take a random
selection) do not differ so very greatly in terms of perception. We may not be able to communicate
well with pigs and sheep, but insofar as we know of information processing tasks relevant to pigs
and sheep, there will be a shared character of physical interaction with the information processing
devices required. The resource costs of initialisation and readout will not be very sensitive to such
details, and we would expect that they could be efficiently translated between the needs of these
different epistemic communities.
What if we move further afield? What if we encounter aliens, with radically different perceptual
capacities? First let us note: if the perceptions of the aliens depend upon a different physics to
the physics of our perceptions, then we are just talking about the cost of information processing
evaluated by a different physical theory. So let us assume that the aliens’ perceptions come from
the same physics, but using radically different physical processes to ours.
In this case it should be possible to analyse and understand those physical processes. We
therefore conjecture: if aliens could perceive something, a talented experimenter can build initiali-
sation and readout systems to use those some perceptual mechanisms, for us (and vice versa). So,
assuming we had not unnecessarily restricted ourselves in some way when analysing fundamental
resources costs, then a different shared epistemic community, based on alien perceptions but using
the same underlying physics, should still yield the same fundamental physical resource costs.
7 Conclusion
So where does this leave our original problem? How can there be a physics of information whilst still
holding on to the idea that information theory succeeds by abstracting the definition of information
processing tasks away from the details of the physical substrates used to instantiate the tasks?
In this chapter we have approached the physics of information from the perspective of estab-
lishing physical resource costs associated with performing information processing tasks. To try and
quantify these costs, we define an information processing task in terms of ‘someone being informed
of something by someone’. While acknowledging that there is a great deal of complexity that
can be hidden in those terms, the someones involved are themselves physically embodied agents,
and the physical means by which they start and end the process of informing must be included
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within the specification of how the information processing task is to be instantiated. These are
the initialisation and readout stages of information processing, which provide physical connections
between the physically embodied agents and the information processing devices.
The physical means by which the task is performed does not need to be specified at this
point: indeed, if the objective is to derive a fundamental resource cost, then specific models should
be avoided. However, a proof of a physical resource cost cannot be wholly independent of the
fundamental physics used to evaluate that cost. So any resource cost claim has to be made relative
to a theory of physics:
• Many of the traditional resource-cost claims are based on the assumption of: classical physics,
non-relativistic space-times, and unavoidable noise. Although physical systems for instanti-
ating classical information processing devices are based on quantum theory (semi-conductor
physics), the specifically quantum nature of the systems was not considered relevant for how
the information processing was analysed.
• Quantum computing has generally been analysed on the assumption of: quantum physics,
non-relativistic space-times, and models of decoherence that allow error correction. Recently,
the problems of relativistic quantum information have been raised.
• Hypercomputational models such as Malament–Hogarth have been analysed in the context
of classical, general relativistic space-times.
• Quantum gravity or general probabilistic theories would further change what is possible.
Once the relevant physical theory has been selected, the evaluation of the resource costs becomes
the question of whether the five criteria can be met for the information processing task given that
physical theory. This means, for example, models such as analogue computing or hypercomputation
may seem viable when evaluated with respect to one kind of physical theory, but not with respect
to another.
The greatest practical importance should obviously be attached to the assumptions that cor-
respond to our current best physical theories, but the ever present possibility that these theories
may need revision should make us cautious about ruling out exotic models of computation in prin-
ciple. There is an interesting corollary here, though: actually building a system to perform some
computational task with a resource cost below a minimum threshold could be taken as prima facie
experimental evidence against a physical theory that sets that threshold.
Relative to a given physical theory, there may be some particular tasks that can be efficiently
implemented, and may be efficiently combined as building blocks out of which all other tasks can
be constructed. These building blocks may be used to define a logic of information processing that
is well suited to the physical theory: thus Boolean logic gates are a basis for classical information
processing, and quantum operations are a basis for quantum information processing. Equally, some
resource costs may turn out to be particularly useful or ubiquitous within a given physical theory,
and, like the Shannon and Schumacher measures, become regarded as a measure of information
within that theory.
It should be noted that the consistency of a given abstract logic of information processing is
not dependent upon physics: the only question is whether that logic can be efficiently implemented
within a given physical theory. So information processing can continue to be studied in the abstract,
independent of the means of physical instantiation. However, the interplay with physics means
that sometimes physics will suggest new ways of analysing information processing tasks, enriching
both fields, and logics which best match our current best physics will be the ones best suited for
understanding the physical resource costs of real information processing devices.
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